Moral Panic Revisited: Part 2 by Hamilton, Claire
Moral panic revisited-Part two , 
' 
Claire Hamilton LL.B. (Ling. Franc.), B.L., M.Litt., DipEurCon on Human Rights. Assistant 
Lecturer in Criminology at DIT. 
Critiques of moral panic 
In part one of this article (I.C.L.J. 2005(1 )), the evolution of 
moral panic theory was traced from its coinage by Stanley 
Cohen1 in 1972 until the present day. It was observed that 
since the 1990s, "moral panic" hils strayed from its original 
sociological base to become a term regularly used by 
journalists to describe a variety of phenomena, sometimes 
pejoratively, sometimes not. In the light of this ambiguity, 
and the considerable body of criticism which has been 
encountered by proponents of tlu:: concept, it is timely to 
take stock of the strengths and weaknesses of the concept. 
It is proposed in this article to attempt to determine its curre:nt 
usefulness through a critical examination of the main 
challenges to moral panic theory. 
These can be convenkntly divided into three categories: 
(1) that moral panic fails to "take crime seriously"; {2) that it 
is a political value judgment; and lastly, (3) that it is an 
anachronism which has not kept pace with today's society. 
Takin:g crime seriously and left realism 
The first criticisms of moral panic are worthy of pll}iicular 
attention. Criminological theory, as would be hoped, has 
not remained fixed in aspic throughout the last three 
decades. Labelling theory and its brainchild, moral panic, 
underwent a process of reevaluation in the 1980s; most 
notably at the _hands of those crimi.!fologists wP.o 4e:;;¢be 
themselves as "left realists'·'. Ironically, O!fe of ;1)he fi;r~t 
founding fathers ofleft re.alism has been Jock XcnlJ;Jg, w:lw 
is credited with the flrst pl]!bljshed .use ofthe telTI,l ''wora1 
pa;nic'' in his 1971 essay .on the amplificatory ef~~ct o;f 
polic:ing on cannabis use .in I,ondon's Notting HilV This 
begs the question: has "(oul).g abandoned the con,c.:pt 
because it is .unworkable ,in a modern context or has 'he 
discovered some glaring th_ew;et~ca1 inconsiste0:cy? JP,,w;tY 
event, his critique merits serious C()l).Sideration. · · 
I1;1 order to set Young's critjcj:.ms _in .c_ont_ext, it .is 
necessary to examin~ briefty the th7ory beh~nd le:ft ~\lUst 
criminology.3 Its fundamental tenets are to take cril);'le 
seriously and to be true to the reality of crime. It charters a 
course between establis~ent c~i~in0logy and.liberal o.r 
left-leaning theories of crime and ~~eks to .resolve the 
aetiological crisis in c_~imin~l9gy ,by.,ewl;r~s~:\lg .\Vh?,t XoYJ?.g 
calls the dyad of crime: the .ac~io.!f <ll)d _1;he .:t;e~J.ctio.J;J., tlie 
criminal act and its control. This ~y(ld ciiu b~ .:fUi:i;he~ br~ke~ 
down into victim, offender, .infon:nat".control itnd formal 
control. By bringing all ,t4es~. ~le~~11t~ :!~:%e~~r, re~li~ts 
contend thatthey haye a_chi~v~d@)asta~ly,holistic view 
of crime while.e~cl;lew,il;lgpJ;evious.the()riesfor; their pi!liiality 
of focus. · · ., · · ·.. . . · · · · ' .. · · · · · 
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So what IU'e the implicatign,s ofleft realism for the theory 
of moral panic? This questi!'l11 ree.eives the fullest treatment 
in Young's article on left realist .criminology in the Oxford 
Handbook ofCriminology.4 Young claims that criminologists 
have been guilty jn their application of the theory of a certain 
partiality of focus-focusing on the reaction to the crime 
within society and the criminaljl:tstice systew at the expense 
of the actual ~rime itself, the significance of which is 
downplayed. Indeed, Young's critique of left idealism is 
replete with similar aspersions: crime is sidelined, glossed 
over, warginalised; it is not t)le focus of attention. In a 
oblique reference to the wor~ .of, inter alia, Cohen, Young 
castigates what he sees as a minimisation of the effect of 
crime: "[Realism] emerged as a critique of a predominant 
te;ndency in left-wing and liberal commentaries which 
downplayed th~ problem of crime, talking about media-
instigated moral panics and irrational fears of crime. "5 
Young sees moral panic :;ts forming an important part of 
the libertarian armoury in attempts to underplay the effects 
of crime and overstate the effects of the reaction against it. 
He outlines his objections in more detail, however, in his 
response t<;> the arguments of two American authors, Nils 
Christie ~nd William .Chambliss, one of these being that 
concern ab<;mt crime is a moral panic. Young ebulliently 
dismisses claims of a moral panic about crime in America: 
"This ,is\';urely lef;tJd,ealism with a vengeance! To talk 
of moral panj,c t;tbout crime in the United States 
begg(lrS the imaginaticm and trivialises a concept 
which yvas intro_<i,uced .to contrast the panic about 
1ll~1.1or offe1;1ces (e.g. c.afll.labis or Mods fighting on 
~r;igbton be~c.l:les) .~itJ). :me real problem of crime (see 
. Cqhen., 1972_; Y o\111g, 1:?71) .... [T]he general homicide 
,rate .i~ ~t~gg_.:W<gly ;h,i~h: ~he number of homicides, 
fo;rex~ple, iJ?, Los Angeles with a population of 3.5 
million is gre<tterJha,nthat9fEngland and Wales with 
ov~r fifty milli91.1 inlutl;Jim»ts (Currie, 1996) Surely crime 
must be a major co,ncern. lJ1deed, from a European 
p~rspective, how cq1,1\d s~ch 11- level of violence be 
.other than.ofgreat,mora;l concern? And, i11deed, the 
American publi~· h~~~ ,co~sistently rated crtrne as a 
.pro~le:m a~ hln~e A:fric~ AWericans in particular. Yet, 
th~ pub~\c _(ll"e l'l.W~fl~te<;l by the.se writers as if they 
are cultyr!ll du,p~~wh.ose,a,ttitudes and opinions are a 
proquc;t,ofwatching too ml,!oh TV"6 
. . ·: .. ~ ',.. . . . . . . . '· : : . . . ... "· .. 
It would ;~PP.~~r .fl:qw-:t9:e ;<1;b9ye passage that Young does 
not disJ:n,is~thewo_r:~l :Pa1,1ic c9ncept per se. From a realist 
perspecti-ve, ,it§e,ew_s,to ,r.t7ta.\n sm;ne usefulness and validity, 
yet aP.p,~r~~~ly. qniyin' ~\{e c;ontext.:of r~latively minor 
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offences. Furthermore, Young claims to eschew the concept 
of irrationality which he believes lies at the centre of the 
idea of moral panic. He claims that the idea that there is a 
rational level offear is itselffundamentally t1awcd as general 
rates of crime often obscure the high risks of crime to which 
certain subgroups in society are exposed. lf the "most 
vulnerable members of our society have the greatest risks 
of crime", the impact of crime on them will be greater, due to 
the other social problems \Vhich they experience. Account 
should also be taken of "invisible" dangers: women, for 
example, may have a greater fear of crime because of sexual 
harassment or domestic violence. Low victimisation risks 
for certain categories of people may also be due in large 
part to the elaborate steps they take in order to minimise 
their risk of crime. In short, Young seeks to explode what he 
terms the "myth of the equal victim". In the light of these 
different sub-cultural positions, Young argues, many of the 
apparent "irrationalities" appear increasingly rational 7 
Young's arguments cannot be dismissed lightly. Let us 
tlrst address the contention that moral panic is a concept 
vvhich focuses solely on the criminal justice system 
response, thus sidelining the real issue of crime and 
adopting a skewed approach to the problem. It should be 
pointed out that crime is very much the focus of moral panic 
theory. As discussed in part one ofthis article, an excessive, 
disproportionate response is a sine qua non when it comes 
to moral panic. For this reason, the empirical measure of the 
criminal acts complained of are at the very epicentrc of any 
work on moral panic. Far from being sidelined or 
marginalised, it is the central problematic--is society's 
reaction to the behaviour proportionate to the threat it is 
t~1cing in objective terms? Proportionality can be ascertained 
by comparing the reaction to the problem \Vith that elicited 
by a similarly harmful condition or by comparing statistics 
\\ith other jurisdictions, as Young did abo\ e.' Further, it 
\Vas certainly not the aim of Cohen, the progenitor of moral 
panic theory, to sideline crime. As CottC\: nutes in his recent 
critique oflctl realism, "as a criticism ofCohcn 's approach, 
this is indefensible."'' Writing in 1971, Cohen stated that he 
\\as not "trying to deny an objective reality or even less 
trying to present the Mods and Rockers as innocent victims 
of conspiracy and discrimination".'" His aim \\as simply to 
dnm attention to the tllct that there\\ as "evidence to suggest 
that the development of this bchil\ iour \\as not independent 
ofthc reaction it pro\okcd."'' 
An important question mark must also be placed over 
Young's attempt to limit the application of the concept of 
moral panic. Where is the line to be drmm and the "real 
problem of crime" said to begin'? An.: sociologists to "cherry-
pick" the types of crime to \\ h ich the theory may haYc a 
potential application') Young himsclf\\TOtc about a moral 
panic mer soft drugs. Docs the same logic not therefore 
apply lO social reactions and pulice be hen iour tlm ards 
"hard" drug uscrs'7 The anomalies arc manifest \\hen one 
adopts this logic. Furthermore, although Young cites 
Cohen's study in support of his argument, it is clear that 
although Cohen applied the concept to rclatiYe!y minor acts 
j(} 
of deviance associated with the Mods and Rockers, he 
viewed it as having a wider application. In Folk Devils. he 
refers to the shooting ofthree policemen in London in 1966, 
together with subsequent discoveries of the activities of 
organised criminal gangs, as having "laid the foundation at 
the time for a moral panic about violent crime."'" Certainly 
there is no hint of an "upper-limit" within the definition 
itself: "a condition, episode, person or group of persons" is 
the tonn of words employed. Most importantly, if moral panic 
is to be viewed as a truly empirical concept and not simply 
an ideological expedient, it should be possible to apply it to 
a range ofditlerent phenomena. This has certainly been the 
experience of the thirty years succeeding its launch. 
This leaves us with Young's evisceration of the concept 
of irrationality. It will be recalled that he took issue with the 
discrepancy between risks of crime and fears of crime by 
drawing attention to the everyday risks which some of the 
more disadvantaged members of society face-for such 
people, crime is often a compounding factor. Certainly, it is 
hard to deny the validity of the emotional force behind 
Young's argument. For many people, crime, either directly, 
through criminal acts suffered, or indirectly, through fear of 
crime, has brought about a real deterioration in their quality 
of life. Fear and concern about crime do grow out of the 
very real conditions of social I ife. 
However, this does not mean that they \\·ill be 
commensurate with the concrete threat posed and does not 
detract from the need for a sense of proportion. The facts 
remain that people's concerns may be fuelled by threats 
that are exaggerated or even nonexistent. A brief glance 
through history will provide suftlcient confirmation of this. 
For example, in Renaissance Europe approximately 500,000 
persons wen: executed as \Vitches, 1·' and in the great purge 
under Stalin, millions of loyal Soviet citizens \Vere declared 
traitors or saboteurs and were executed or shipped to Siberia. 
Excessive fear has also been a feature of modernity. Jenkins 
notes hcnY, in the late 1980s, in Britain a panic o'·er satanic 
ritual child abuse had been manipulated "out of practically 
nothing". 14 
M01·al panic-political value judgment or empirical ve1ity'? 
Young is not alone in his denigration of the concept. Another 
vocal critic has been Waddington, 1 ' who has argued that 
moral panic is an inherently ideological concept, a 
comTnientlool employed by the left for its own political 
ends. ln short, he suggests that it is "a polemical rather 
than an analytical concept". This is at the centre of the 
controversy surrounding the theory. The term is felt to 
belong to left-\\ ing polemic rather than detached historical 
analysis. While the concept has been O\'cr-uscd in the 
press, and more otten than not lends itself to a left-wing, 
critical interpretation of events, it must be stressed that this 
is not one of its intrinsic reuturcs. The concept is csscnti,dly 
empirically based and should be conceptualised as such. 
As Ungar"' has also noted, "taking a critical posture is not 
inherently unscientific. Rather, it depends on \vhethcr or 
not observers have sufficiently ngorous c\ idcnee to 
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support the contention that particular reactions are 
unwarranted." 17 To insist on pinning a radical badge to the 
concept is indeed to trivialise it. 
In support of his argument, Waddington attacks the 
criteria of proportionality at the heart of moral panic theory. 
His criticisms are formulated thus: "Without some clear 
criteria of proportionality, the description of publicly 
expressed concern, anxiety or alarm as a 'moral panic' is no 
more than a value judgment. It simply says that the person 
using the term does not believe that the particular problem 
is sufficiently serious to warrant these expressions of 
concern or actions designed to remedy the problem."18 
The difficulty with Waddington's argument is that he 
treats moral panic as if it were a label to be casually attached 
to a society's reaction to a given problem or behaviour. As 
discussed above, it is impossible to discern whether amoral 
panic is occurring without an assessment of the objective 
indicators of the problem. This then enables an assessment 
as to the proportionality of the response. It is not difficult 
to think of indicators of disproportionality. Goode and Ben-
Yehuda19, in a direct response to Waddington's criticisms, 
have suggested four criteria of proportionality, which are 
gratefully adopted here: 
(z) Figures exaggerated 
If the figures cited to measure the scope of the problem are 
grossly exaggerated, this provides an important clue as to 
the existence of a moral panic. 
(ii) Figures fabricated 
In a similar vein, figures may be fabricated to mobilise the 
public against a non-existent threat. 
(iii) Other harmful conditions 
This is a particularly useful indicator. It involves finding a 
comparator in order to assess the public reaction. If the 
attention paid to the behaviour in question is much greater 
than that paid to another equally harmful, or perhaps more 
damaging, condition, then the criterion can be said to have 
been met. The classic example of this is the public reaction 
to legal and illegal drug use respectively. 
(iv) Changes over time 
If the objective threat posed by the behaviour remains 
constant, yet the attention paid to it in the public arena is 
much greater than before, this also will satisfy the criteria of 
disproportionality. 
While certain conditions do not admit of scien~ific 
assessment,2° it remains true that in a substantial number of 
situations it is possible to locate a moral panic using 
empirical and objective means without resorting to a simple 
value judgment. This is certainly true with a continuous, 
behaviour-based activity such as crime. While the "real" 
crime rate is largely illusory, official statistics can provide a 
valuable "barometer of crime", particularly as indicators of 
change over time. This is primarily because of the stability 
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in which indictable crime figures are collated and categorised 
by the police. Moreover, for certain offences it is possible 
to obtain reasonably accurate estimates of the crime 
situation from a combination of official crime statistics and 
victimisation studies, which, despite their many differences, 
can be complementary.21 Overall, the information we have 
on crime does allow a comparison to be made between the 
seriousness of the deviance in question and the concomitant 
public reaction. 
Is moral panic an anachronism? 
The last critique approaches the topic of moral panic from a 
somewhat different angle, endorsing the validity of moral 
panic as originally conceived by Cohen22 and Hall et a!. 23 
but urging a reevaluation of the concept in terms of either 
( 1) the exponential growth of the media and an increasingly 
pluralist society or (2) the phenomenon known as "risk 
society". 
(1) Moral panic in a multi-mediated world 
The first argument, advanced by sociologists McRobbie 
and Thornton, 24 has two main planks, namely that "society" 
and "the media" cannot, in the modem world, be ascribed 
in moral panic theory to such convenient monolithic blocks. 
First of all, the plurality of voices within society today, so 
the argument runs, means that the folk devil himself, in the 
midst of moral panic, can fight back. Interest and pressure 
groups and various lobbying bodies representing the views 
of the deviant are sufficiently organised to provide the media 
with an all-important alternative view to the one put forward 
by official bodies. Moreover, the diversification of the media 
has meant that folk devils often have their own media, an 
example being the Big Issue, the mouthpiece of the 
homeless, or some of the more unconventional TV 
documentaries (such as those often run by Channel 4) 
challenging official views on issues such as drugs. The 
second, vital point made by the authors is that society itself 
has changed and the media audience has become 
increasingly sophisticated in its grasp of media discourses. 
They note that "[i]n the old models of moral panic, the 
audience remained relatively untheorized. With few 
exceptions, they were the space of consensus, the space of 
media manipulation, the space of an easily convinced 
public."25 
Can these criticisms be sustained? Is the classic model 
of moral panic in need of urgent revision? Let us consider 
these challenges to the concept from the point of view of 
the working class criminal, the classic folk devil. It cannot 
seriously be contended that in everyday reportage of crime 
stories, the view of the criminal receives equal representation 
to that of the State, or indeed the victim (or the victim's 
relatives) in an increasingly victim-orientated criminal justice 
field. 26 While there are organizations which present 
opposing views such as civil liberties groups or prisoners' 
bodies, these organizations are only likely to become 
involved in very serious cases. As Schlesinger and Tumber27 
have noted, in crime reporting, the recognition of the police 
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